




“Christus secundum spiritum”: Spinoza, Jesus and the Infinite Intellect 
Yitzhak Y. Melamed 

“O youth deprived of understanding, who has bewitched you into believing that you eat and hold in your intestines, that which is supreme and eternal?”​[1]​






Part I: On How the Circle took on the Nature of a Square
On November 15, 1675, a year and a half before Spinoza’s death, Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society in London and an old friend of Spinoza, wrote to him:
“As far as I can gather from your last letter, the issuing of the book intended by you for the general public is in danger. I cannot but approve your purpose in signifying your willingness to elucidate and moderate those passages in the Theological Political Treatise which have proved a stumbling block to readers” (Ep. 71).

The Theological-Political Treatise was published anonymously five years earlier, in 1670. The book whose publication, according to Oldenburg, was in danger, was Spinoza’s magnum opus, the Ethics, which was eventually published half a year after Spinoza’s death in 1677. Oldenburg continued the letter by pointing out three crucial issues on which Spinoza’s stand was likely to offend Christian readers. One of these was Spinoza’s opinion about the nature of Christ:
Furthermore, they say that you are concealing your opinion with regard to Jesus Christ, Redeemer of the World, sole Mediator of mankind, and of his incarnation and atonement (Ep. 71).

Oldenburg attempted to convince Spinoza to disclose his opinion on this issue and assured him that if he would do that and “satisfy reasonable and intelligent Christians,” Spinoza’s position would be secured.

In response (conjectured date November or December 1675) to this request, Spinoza wrote:
Finally, to disclose my meaning more clearly on the third head, I say that for salvation it is not altogether necessary to know Christ according to the flesh; but with regard to the eternal son of God, that is, God’s eternal wisdom, which has manifested itself in all things and chiefly in the human mind, and most of all in Jesus Christ, a very different view must be taken [dico ad salutem non esse omnino necesse Christum, secundum carnem noscere; sed de aeterno illo Dei filio, hoc est Dei aeterna sapientia, quae sese in omnibus rebus, et maxime in mente humana et maxime in mente Christi Jesu manifestavit, longe aliter sentiendum]. For without this,​[3]​ no one can attain to a state of blessedness, since this alone teaches what is true and false, good and evil. And since, as I have said, this wisdom has been manifested most of all through Jesus Christ, his disciples have preached it as far as he revealed it to them [quatenus ab ipso fuit revelata], and have shown themselves able to glory above all others in that spirit of Christ. As to the additional teachings of certain Churches that God took upon himself human nature, I have expressly indicated that I do not understand what they say.​[4]​ Indeed, to tell the truth, they seem to me to speak no less absurdly than one who might tell me that a circle has taken on the nature of a square [circulus naturam quadrati induerit].
This, I think suffices to explain what is my opinion on those three heads [capitibus]. As to whether it is likely to please the Christians of your acquaintance, you will know better than I. Farewell.​[5]​

Spinoza’s impatient tone, his claim that the belief in the incarnation is contradictory nonsense,​[6]​ and the doubt he casts upon the extent to which Christ’s pupils received the wisdom of Christ, were clearly not helpful in appeasing Oldenburg, as we shall soon see. Moreover, Spinoza’s identification of the infinite intellect (“God’s eternal wisdom”) with the “eternal Son of God” should have bothered Oldenburg, since it was part of a bold move through which Spinoza attempted to distinguish between “Christ according to the spirit” – nothing other than the infinite intellect, an infinite and eternal mode of God which is not a man, and never had the likeness of man – and “Christ according to the flesh,” the son of Joseph and Mary who was crucified, but not resurrected, as we shall see.​[7]​ This man, “Christ according to the flesh,” may have been more intelligent than any other human being if we take Spinoza’s word at face value, but like any other creature, he was only a finite and limited mode of God.​[8]​ We should also observe that Spinoza describes the belief in the human “Christ” in the rather critical and ironic expression of being “secundum carnem.”

Before examining Spinoza’s identification of “Christ according to the spirit” with the infinite intellect, we should make clear what bothered Oldenburg in the first place, since there are quite a few readers (both Jews and Christians) who consider Spinoza’s Theological Political Treatise (henceforth – TTP) a Christian text advocating the supremacy of Jesus’ teaching above Moses’ laws (and indeed, Spinoza makes several claims in this spirit in the text of the TTP).​[9]​ Consider, for example, recent claims by Graeme Hunter, who argues that Spinoza was just a radical protestant:	
Spinoza's radicalism is still internal to Protestant Christianity. It shares Protestant concerns for the future and purity of Christianity.​[10]​

One reason for writing the TTP was to show how the minimalistic Christianity developed in Chapter 14 could be the official religion of a progressive modern state, which Judaism in [Spinoza's] view, could not… Of Christianity [Spinoza] rejects only sectarianism.  Non-Sectarian Christianity is his solution to the political, moral and spiritual problems of Holland. ​[11]​

In order to understand why Oldenburg suspected that Spinoza’s sympathetic claims about Christ in the TTP could not be taken at face value, we should examine a writing practice Spinoza systematically employed in his discussion of Christianity in the TTP. In these discussions, Spinoza presents claims that are likely to appeal to Christian readers, and then supports these claims by appealing to other doctrines that he clearly rejects. I will present two examples of this writing practice in the following sections. 

Part II: Blessed are the Innocent for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven

In the last two chapters of the TTP, Spinoza argues that the sovereign has the sole authority to decide on issues of religion and piety, and that religious ritual should be supervised and approved by the state. 
It is clear from both experience and reason, then, that divine law depends solely upon the decrees of the sovereign authorities, and hence that they are its interpreters.​[12]​
No one has the right and power without [the sovereigns’] authority or consent, to administer sacred matters or choose ministers, or decide and establish the foundations and doctrines of a church, nor may they give judgment about morality and observation of piety, or excommunicate or receive anyone into the church or care for the poor.​[13]​

In this context, Spinoza had to tackle an objection that his Christian readers were likely to raise. Since the early Christians acted against the orders of the Roman authorities and were not granted permission to preach, Spinoza had to explain by which right they did so.
But if anyone should ask now, “By what right could Christ's disciples, who were private men, preach religion?" I say that they did this by right of the control they had received from Christ over unclean Spirits (see Matthew 10:1). For above, at the end of Chapter 16, I explicitly warned that everyone was bound to keep faith even with a Tyrant, except that person to whom God, by a certain revelation, had promised special aid against the Tyrant. So it is not permissible for anyone to take this as an example, unless he also has the power to perform miracles. This is likewise evident from the fact that Christ also admonished his disciples not to fear those who kill the body (G III/233).

This is a dense and important text, so let us clarify it step by step. For Spinoza, belief in ghosts and unclean spirits is completely ridiculous. In the second chapter of the TTP, Spinoza attempts to convince his readers to distance themselves from these beliefs, claiming that a “true Christian” cannot believe in ghosts, since this belief truly belongs to the Pharisees (G III/43). In his correspondence with Hugo Boxel, Spinoza mocks Boxel’s belief in ghosts.​[14]​ For Spinoza, the belief in ghosts, like the belief in miracles, is nothing but superstition. Indeed, in the letter to Oldenburg we have already encountered, Spinoza loses his patience and caution and openly claims that the essential feature of Christianity is just this: superstition.
[T]he chief distinction I make between religion and superstition is that the latter is founded on ignorance, the former on wisdom. And this I believe is the reason why Christians are distinguished from other people not by faith, nor charity, nor the other fruits of the Holy Spirit. But solely by an opinion they hold, namely, because, as they all do, they rest their case on miracles, that is ignorance, which is the source of all wickedness [quæ omnis malitiæ fons est], and thus they turn their faith, true as it may be, into superstition (Ep. 73). ​[15]​

Let us return to Spinoza’s claim about the “right against unclean spirits.” At the beginning of the Sixteenth Chapter of the TTP, Spinoza presents his bold view that one’s right is coextensive with one’s power​[16]​ – the more power one has, the more right she or he has. This is one of the most fundamental principles of Spinoza’s political philosophy. At the end of the sixteenth chapter, Spinoza stresses that one must always obey the sovereign even when the sovereign’s orders appear contrary to religion.  According to Spinoza, “The supreme right of deciding about religion belongs to the sovereign power… All men are obliged to obey his decrees and commands about religion.”​[17]​ However, Spinoza does suggest an exception to this general rule:
This is the case for all except he to whom God has promised, by a particular revelation, assistance against tyrants or specifically granted an exception.​[18]​

Spinoza’s sardonic view is quite simple. If one believes he has the power to perform miracles and supernatural acts such as exorcising ghosts, he may well have the right and power to challenge the sovereign by preaching on religious issues without taking permission from the sovereign. Naturally, the sovereign will use his power and right to restrain such people.  The issue will then be resolved by the performance of a miracle, or lack thereof.  If a miracle occurs, it proves that the religious challenger had indeed both right and power. If the religious challenger is not miraculously saved, this proves that the challenger had neither power nor right, and he or she is left to cry: “My God, My God, Why have you forsaken me?” Alternatively, the religious challenger may simply not fear those who “kill the body,” in which case the sovereign will not be able to threaten him effectively, but can still use his power and right to assert his dominion in this world.

In the third chapter of the Political Treatise, Spinoza repeats the very same claims, this time stressing that he has no power against unclean spirits, as if insinuating, “Well, if you believe in ghosts and in right of control over unclean spirits – go ahead. Try your luck!”
I do not have, as the Disciples of Christ formerly had, the power to cast out unclean spirits and to perform miracles. This power, of course, is so necessary for spreading Religion to places where it is forbidden, that without it not only do we waste time and trouble, as they say, but in addition we create a great many sources of distress (G  III/289).

Another passage commonly cited as indicating Spinoza’s sympathy toward Christianity appears in the first chapter of the TTP, where Spinoza discusses the manner in which God revealed himself to the prophets. He claims that the prophetic revelation is mostly a product of the prophets’ imagination and a certain image or voice which appears in the imagination. An exception to this characterization is the manner in which God was “revealed” to Christ. Since the New Testament never mentions that God appeared or spoke to Christ, but rather that God was revealed to the Apostles through Christ, Spinoza concludes that Christ communicated with God without any mediation.
Therefore, if Moses spoke with God face to face as a man with his friend (that is, through the mediation of two bodies), Christ communicated with God from mind to mind (G III/21).

At first sight, this passage seems to ascribe clear advantage to Christ over the other prophets (if the term prophet can at all be applied to Jesus). Moses spoke with God in the manner two people speak to each other: the mind of Ferdinand causes Ferdinand’s body to generate certain physical language signs (e.g., voices, letters, or images); Isabelle’s body senses these signs, and then causes certain changes in Isabelle’s mind. This was the form of communication between Moses (the greatest Jewish prophet) and God, but not between Christ and God, since Christ communicated with God “mind to mind” without the mediation of a body.

This seems to be a straightforward and intriguing claim. However, one who is acquainted with Spinoza’s view on the mind-body problem should immediately wonder whether this claim makes sense. The mental communication model we have just examined – the mind of Ferdinand causing certain changes in the body of Ferdinand, causing changes in the body of Isabelle, causing changes in the mind of Isabelle – is a quite commonsense and indeed Cartesian model, but one that Spinoza rejects outright. For Spinoza, there is never a causal connection between a mind and a body, and hence no mind can communicate with another mind through the mediation of bodies. A mode of thought (i.e., a mind) can cause a change in another mode of thought (another mind), and a body can change another body, but a body cannot causally interact with a mind. This causal barrier between the attributes of Thought and Extension is one of the most important principles of Spinoza’s metaphysics, and Spinoza invokes it numerous times in the Ethics. Hence, for example, the second proposition of part three of the Ethics reads:
The Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the Body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else) [Nec corpus mentem ad cogitandum, nec mens corpus ad motum, neque ad quietem, nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest].

If two minds can never communicate through their bodies, then it is not clear what is so special about Christ’s communication with God “mind to mind.” Aren’t the minds of Ferdinand and Isabelle also communicating mind to mind? Was Spinoza intentionally using a communication model that he clearly rejected? 

We may add another question here. A few lines before presenting the claim that Christ communicated with God “mind to mind,” Spinoza notes:
God can communicate with men directly (for he communicates his essence to our mind without the use of any physical means) (TTP, Ch. 1| G III/20).​[19]​

If God communicates his essence to our minds directly, what is so special about the manner in which Christ communicated with God? 

Part III: Christ or the Son of God or the Infinite Intellect
At the beginning of this paper I suggested that for Spinoza “Christ according to the spirit” is none but the divine wisdom [Dei aeterna sapientia] or the infinite intellect.  In a letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza singles out Paul as a prophet who was not deceived to believe in the physical resurrection of Christ and who “rejoices that he knows Christ not after the flesh, but after the spirit [gloriatur, quod Christum non secundum carnem, sed secundum spiritum noverit].” ​[20]​ Paul was Spinoza’s favorite Biblical author.​[21]​ In the fourth chapter of the TTP, Spinoza argues that Paul “did not wish to speak openly, but as he says (Romans 3:5 and 6:19), he speaks in a human manner” and according to the “weakness of the flesh” (G III/65). Addressing Paul’s claim that “no one is made blessed unless he has in himself the mind of Christ” (Romans 8:9), Spinoza comments “by which he perceives God's laws as eternal truths.” This brief comment discloses Spinoza’s agreement with Paul’s doctrine of predestination and rejection of free will,​[22]​ but it also seems to identify the mind of Christ with the infinite intellect, which harbors all eternal truths. In the same discussion, Spinoza suggests:
Christ was not so much a Prophet as the mouth of God [os Dei]. For God revealed certain things to the human race through the mind of Christ (as we have shown in Chapter I), as previously he had revealed them through Angels, i.e., through a created voice, visions, etc.

The metaphor of the mouth presents Christ’s mind as a certain expansion or emanation of God. Indeed, in his early composition, the Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being, Spinoza writes of the infinite intellect:
 [It] is a Son, product or immediate creature of God, also created by him from all eternity, and remaining immutable for all eternity.​[23]​

Spinoza has little sympathy for the Trinity and the doctrine of Divine Persona. In another early work, while attempting to explain the relationship between God’s essence, his intellect and his will, Spinoza writes: 
Not that we are ignorant of the term personality, which the Theologians commonly use to explain this matter. But though we are familiar with the term, we do not know its meaning, nor can we form any clear and distinct concept of it.​[24]​

He then adds ironically: “Nevertheless, we believe firmly that God will reveal this to his own, in the most blessed vision of God which is promised to the faithful.”​[25]​ In his early works, Spinoza uses the terminology of the “Son of God” to refer to a particular kind of entity in his metaphysics: the immediate infinite mode (i.e., an entity which does not constitute God’s essence, but follows immediately from God’s essence), and primarily to the immediate infinite mode of the attribute of thought –  the infinite intellect.​[26]​ However, when Lodewijk Meyer, his friend and editor, attempts to scrutinize this terminology and asks Spinoza about his view on the nature of the relation between God and his Son, Spinoza replies: “this matter is of no importance to me, if you think this can offend certain theologians, do as it seems best to you,” and then adds “what theologians understand by the term personality escapes me, but not what philologists understand by that word.”​[27]​

At this point it may seem that Spinoza’s identification of Christ with God’s eternal wisdom or the infinite intellect is perfectly consistent with Christianity, since similar claims can be found in many Christian texts having a neo-Platonic orientation (and in fact even in the famous opening of John: “In the beginning was the Word”). 

Unlike Christian neo-Platonists, Spinoza uses the identification of Christ and the infinite intellect to detach Christ “according to the spirit” from its Christian context. We have already seen Spinoza’s claim (addressed to Oldenburg) that “for salvation it is not altogether necessary to know Christ according to the flesh.” The same claim appears in several places in the TTP.​[28]​ In the fifth chapter, Spinoza argues:
It is due to the salutary opinions that follow from them that narratives of the Old and New Testaments are superior to others. Hence, if anyone reads these stories of holy Scripture and believes all of them without paying attention to the doctrines that the Bible uses them to teach, and without amending his life, he might just as well read the Koran or the dramatic plays of the poets, or at any rate the common chronicles, with the same attention that the common people usually give to their reading. On the other hand, as we have said, he who is completely ignorant of them, and nevertheless has salutary opinions and true conception of living, is truly happy and truly has within him the spirit of Christ.​[29]​

According to this last passage, the Christianity of the New Testament is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for having the Spirit of Christ. The crucifixion, resurrection and the second coming of Christ are presented by Spinoza as helpful narratives that might promote the education of certain people, but Christianity – the belief in the narratives of the New Testament – stops being the sole or even sufficient condition for salvation and for the knowledge of Christ according to the spirit.​[30]​ In this sense, Spinoza detaches “Christ according to the spirit” from its Christian context, and identifies it with the infinite intellect. Why, then, did the authors of the New Testament associate “Christ according to the Spirit” (the infinite intellect) with “Christ according to the flesh” (i.e., the son of Miriam and Joseph who was crucified)? Spinoza’s answer is simple. Prophets prophesize according to their own imaginations and intellectual capacities, as well as those of their target audiences. “Christ’s resurrection from the dead… was revealed only to the faithful according to their understanding.”​[31]​ God adopts his words to the understanding of his audience. Those who cannot conceive of Christ according to the intellect and through this rational belief lead moral lives, should be restrained by the belief in Christ according to the flesh – that is, Christian narratives and ceremonies.

An Epilogue: Ecce Homo
Spinoza used Christian language quite systematically in his discussion of religion. As far as I can see, he also had a genuine sympathy for the figure of Christ, and to the universal teachings of Christianity. He greatly appreciated the political dimensions of Christianity and indeed considered as perhaps one of the most successful theological political devises in human history.​[32]​  Yet, toward the end of his life, when pressed by Oldenburg, the rupture with his Christian friends seemed inevitable.

Earlier I suggested that Spinoza’s true biblical hero was none but Paul, to whom Spinoza frequently ascribed many of his own philosophical views. This topic deserves a study of its own, but since it is closely related to the current topic, let me point out two crucial texts. In the Eleventh Chapter of the TTP, Spinoza writes:
None of the apostles engaged with philosophy more than Paul who was summoned to preach to the gentiles while the others, who preached to the Jews, the despisers of philosophy, likewise adapted themselves to their minds (See the Epistle to the Galatians 2 XI etc.), and taught a religion devoid of philosophical theory. How happy our age would surely be, were we to see it also free from all superstition.​[33]​

According to this passage, all apostles but Paul adapted themselves to the superstitions of the Jews. Yet, as we saw earlier, toward the end of his life Spinoza claimed that the unique essence of Christianity was superstition. Spinoza attempted on many occasions to persuade his Christian readers to renounce certain beliefs or religious practices, claiming that these beliefs truly belong to “the Pharisees,” and it seems that the issue of superstition may well be part of this rhetoric. However, if Paul was the only apostle whose preaching was not founded on superstition, what was his view on the nature and resurrection of Christ? Let us go back to Ep. 78:
We cannot deny that the Evangelists themselves believed that the body of Christ rose again and ascended to heaven to sit in God’s right hand… Nevertheless, without injury to the teaching of the Gospel, they could have been deceived, as was the case with other prophets… But Paul, to whom Christ also appeared later, rejoices that he knows Christ not after the flesh, but after the spirit.​[34]​

It turns out that according to Spinoza there seem to have been only two true Christian believers who conceived of Christ according to the Spirit (i.e., the infinite intellect), and not according to the flesh (the resurrection). These were Paul and Spinoza himself.

Oldenburg’s disappointment in Spinoza’s reply (in Ep. 73) is hardly surprising in light of the texts we have studied so far. After receiving Spinoza’s letter, Oldenburg approached Spinoza again and asked him how it could be that Spinoza – whom Oldenburg took to be sympathetic to Christianity – denied the doctrine of the incarnation, even though it appears explicitly in the New Testament [“the Word was made flesh” (John 1:14), and “the Son of God took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham” (Hebrews 2:16)].​[35]​ 

Spinoza’s lengthy response to this question deserves to be quoted in full, as it beautifully summarizes Spinoza’s views about the nature of prophecy, the essence of man, and the essence of God:
If you will consider the following points, that Christ did not appear to the Senate, nor to Pilate, nor to any of the unbelievers, but only to the Saints, that God has neither right nor left and is not in any one place but is everywhere in accordance with his essence, that matter is everywhere the same [quod Deus neque dextram , neque sinistram habeat, nec in loco; sed ubique secundum essentiam sit, & quod materia ubique sit eadem], that God does not manifest itself in some imaginary place beyond  the world, and that the frame of the human body is restrained within its proper limits only by the weight of the air, you will easily see that this appearance of Christ is not unlike that whereby God appeared to Abraham when he saw the three men whom he invited to eat with him. But, you will say, all the Apostles were fully convinced that Christ rose again after death and that he really did ascend to heaven; and this I do not deny. For Abraham, too, believed that God partook of a meal with him, and all the Israelites believed that God descended from heaven to Mount Sinai in the midst of fire, and spoke to them directly. Yet, these and many other events of this kind were appearances or revelations adapted to the understanding and beliefs of those men to whom God wished to reveal his mind by these means. I therefore conclude that Christ’s resurrection from the dead was in fact of a spiritual kind and was revealed only to the faithful according to their understanding…” (Ep. 75)

Since God is infinite and present everywhere (“is everywhere according to his essence”)​[36]​, and man is a finite body (“the frame of the human body is restrained within its proper limits only by the weight of the air”), there cannot be any identity between the two. The identification of God with a son of man – like the resurrection – is nothing but a superstition resulting from the believer’s limited understanding. 
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